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OFFIOIAX. DONATION. 



CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL 
MILITARY PARK COMMISSION. 



THE CAMPAIGN FOR CHATTANOOGA, 



HISTORICAL SKETCH DESCRIPTIVE OF THE MODEL IX RELIEF, 

OF THE REGION ABOUT CHATTANOOGA, AND OF THE 

BATTLES ILLUSTRATED THEREON. 



WASHINGTON : 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
1902. 




FEB 14 1903 
D. of D, 



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CAMPAIOM FOR CHATTANOOGA 
THEATRE or OP£W\TIONS 



SHOWING AREA OF 

MODEL INRELIET 



U.;:3.CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL 
MILITARY PARK -COMMISSION. 



THE CAMPAIGN FOR CHATTANOOGA. 



HISTORICAL SKETCH DESCRIPTIVE OF THE MODEL IX RELIEF, 

OF THE REGION ABOUT CHATTANOOGA, AND OF THE 

BATTLES ILLUSTRATED THEREON. 



WASHINGTON : 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 
I 902. 



J^^ 






JL^'C 



TERRAIN AND BATTLES OF THE MODEL. 



[Confederate forces in italics.] 

The Model in Relief was executed by Edwin E. Howell, for the Chicka- 
mauga and Chattanooga National Military Park Commission, under the 
authority of Hon. Elihu Root, Secretary of War, from the very elaborate 
topographical survey of Chattanooga and vicinity made for General Grant 
immediately after the battle of Chattanooga, by Gen. W. F. Smith, Chief 
Engineer of the Armj^ of the Cumberland. The Chickamauga section 
of the model follows the minute topographical survey of that region by 
Everett E. Betts, C. E., Engineer of the Park. 

The troop positions represented agree with such as were officially 
established at the time; the additions represent the results of prolonged 
studies by the Park Commission, acting in cooperation with twenty-six 
State commissions. The latter were composed, in the main, ot veterans 
who served in the campaign for Chattanooga, every State but one (West 
Virginia) having troops engaged being represented by a commission, and 
this State having had but one regiment in the battles. 

The model in relief embraces a territor}- 1 1 by i6 miles. The 
horizontal scale is 500 feet to the inch and the vertical an inch 
and a half to 500 feet. The sides of the model are north and 
sotith, east and west. Lookout Mountain is in the western sec- 
tion. This territory of 176 square miles includes the battlefields 
of Chickamauga and Chattanooga, each covering three days' 
operations, and the minor affairs of Wauhatchie and Brown's 
ferry, by which Hooker's forces from the east, with cooperat- 
ing troops from Chattanooga, reopened the river line of supplies 
to Bridgeport. 



4 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

The battle of Chickamauga, which was Rosecrans's battle for 
the possession of the roads to Chattanooga and the city itself, 
occupied three days. September i8, 1863, and the night of that 
day were devoted by each army to obtaining position, and 
involved only skirmishing, some of it heavy, at various points. 
The igtli and 20th were days of continuous and desperate 
battle. 

The affairs at Wauhatchie and Brown's ferry occurred on the 
27th and 28th of October. The participants were two brigades 
of the Twelfth Corps and two divisions of the Eleventh from 
Bridgeport under Hooker, and two brigades (Hazen's and Tur- 
chin's) from Chattanooga under W. F. Smith, with a sufficient 
detail from a third (Stanley's) to man the boats used in descend- 
ing the river. The opposing Confederate force at "Wauhatchie 
was one division of Long street' s corps. At Brown's ferry were 
parts of two regiments of infantry and two pieces of artillery. 
The movement secured L,ookout Valley to the Union forces, 
opening a short line of supplies both by road and river to the 
railroad at Bridgeport. The battle of Chattanooga also occupied 
three days. Its object was to force Bragg from before the city, 
his lines occupying Lookout Mountain, crossing the valley south 
of the city, and running in front of Missionar}^ Ridge to the river 
above the c\\.y. 

The first day — November 23 — Orchard Knob and the advanced 
Confederate line through the plain were captured. At night 
Sherman crossed the Tennessee opposite the north end of Mis- 
sionary Ridge. November 24 Hooker stormed Lookout Moun- 
tain and carried it and Sherman occupied the northern spurs of 
Mis.sionary Ridge unopposed. November 25 Sherman, from 
his front, assisted by the Eleventh Corps and one division from 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 5 

the Army of the Cumberland, attacked Tunnel Hill. In the 
afternoon Hooker reached Rossville Gap from Lookout Moun- 
tain, cooperating with the Army of the Cumberland, which at 
3.15 p. m. moved with four divisions to the storming of Mis- 
sionary Ridge, carrying first the rifle pits at its base and im- 
mediately after the ridge itself along a front of 3 miles, ending 
the battle, Bragg retreating first to Ringgold and the second 
da}' to Dalton. 

TOPOGRAPHY OF THE TERRITORY REPRESENTED. 

The Chickamauga field is in the valley of that stream. The 
latter within the limits of the field is deep, with precipitous 
banks, except at the fords. Two bridges were made available 
by the Confederates for crossing. The elevation of the stream 
above the sea is 700 feet, and that of the Tennessee at Chatta- 
nooga 634. This field was about two-thirds forest, the woods 
being generally thick with underbrush. The Lafayette road, 
which runs through the center of the field from L,ee & Gordon's 
mill to Rossville Gap, is at Viniard's 28 feet above the Chicka- 
mauga and 80 feet at McDonald's. West of that road the field 
rises more rapidly into the spurs of Missionary Ridge. At the 
Snodgrass House and vicinity the elevations range from 200 to 
250 feet above the river. The field from the river westward 
rises in a succession of low and chiefly wooded ridges. 

Missionary Ridge has an elevation above the plain of from 
286 to 500 feet. lyookout and Raccoon or Sand Mountain have 
a general elevation of 2,300 feet above the sea, and from 1,500 
to 1,700 feet above the Tennessee River. 

The main road to Chattanooga in the line of the opposing 
armies' movements was the State or L,afayette road, which 



6 The Campaign for Oiattanooga. 

crosses the Chickamauga at L,ee & Gordon's mill and passes 
through Missionary Ridge at Rossville Gap. This was the axis 
and prize of the battle, since it largely controlled the advance 
to the cit3'. 

LOCALITIES OF THE CHICKAMAUGA FIELD AND VICINITY. 

The Chickamauga bounds the field on the south-and east. 
The western boundary is the Crawfish Springs road to Macfar- 
lands Gap. The I^afayette road runs from south to north 
through the center of the field, while-, the road from Jay's mill 
on the east to Brotherton's and westward divides it into nearly 
equal north and south areas. 

Passing down the Chickamauga from L,ee & Gordon's mill are 
the following battle localities: Hall's ford, Dalton's or Hunt's 
ford, Thedford's ford, Alexander's bridge, lyambert's or Byram's 
ford, Fowler's ford, Reed's bridge. Dyer's ford. Dyer's bridge, 
Daffern's ford, and Ringgold or Red House Bridge. 

On the lyafaj^ette road, going north from Lee & Gordon's 
to Rossville, are the following houses and fields of the same 
name: Scott's, Viniard's, Brotherton's, Foe's, Kelly's, McDon- 
ald's, and Cloud's. 

On or near the road from Reed's bridge, hy way of Brother- 
ton's westward, are Winfrey's, Brock's, Brotherton's, and 
Dyer's houses and fields of the same name. 

Fassing north on the Crawfish Spring road are Osborn's, T. 
Osborn's, Cave Spring, Weathers's, Widow Glenn's, Bloody 
Fond, Vittetoe's, and Macfarlands Gap. 

The Snodgrass House is north of Dyer's house, and the 
Mullis house and Savannah Church still farther north. 

The horizontal scale of the model (500 feet to the inch) gives 
10.56 inches to the mile. 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 7 

The following table of distances by the roads will serve to fix 
the relative positions of prominent points on the various fields: 

Lee & Gordon's mill to — Miles. 

Viniard's i. 52 

Brotherton's 2. 54 

Kelly's 3. 50 

Cloud's 4. 84 

Rossville 8. 04 

Chattanooga 12. 04 

Ivafayette I3- 90 

Chattanooga to — 

Rossville 4. GO 

Kelly's 8. 54 

I/afayette 26. 00 

Lookout Mountain 3. 00 

Wauhatchie 6. 00 

Macfarlands Gap 6. 77 

Sherman's crossing 3. 00 

Chattanooga, Fort Wood to Missionary Ridge 3. 00 

Wauhatchie to Brown's ferry 4. 00 

Brown's ferry to Chattanooga (across neck) i. 50 

Rossville to — 

Bragg' s headquarters. Missionary Ridge 3- 80 

Tunnel 7. 82 

North end Missionary Ridge 8. 46 

Macfarlands Gap 2. 77 

McDonald's to — 

Reed's bridge : . . . , 2. 50 

Macfarlands Gap 2. 25 

Jay's mill 2. 12 

Brotherton's to Jay's mill 2. 00 

Ringgold to Reed's bridge 6. 25 

Alexander's bridge to — 

Jay's mill I. 55 

McDonald's 3-^5 



8 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

Miles. 

Hall's ford to Ja3^'s mill 2. 80 

Snodgrass House to — 

Brotherton's i- 30 

McDonald's i. 34 

Kelly's 62 

Cloud's 2. 74 

Macfarlands Gap . . 2. 45 

McAfees Church 3- 60 

In McLeniores Cove — 

Lee & Gordon's mill to — 

Crawfish Spring - i. 97 

Glass's mill 4. 72 

Macfarlands Gap to Crawfish Spring 6. 23 

Crawfish Spring to — 

Owens 3- 00 

Pond Spring 5. 00 

Stevens Gap 11. 00 

Doughertys Gap 19. 00 

Davis Crossroads 9. 00 

After the firm possession of Nashville early in 1862, and the 
subsequent battle of Stones River, December 31, 1862, and Jan 
uary i and 2, 1863, the objective of the Army of the Cumber- 
land was Chattanooga. This involved, first, the forcing of the 
Confederate army from Middle Tennessee, and next, a campaign 
against Chattanooga itself. 

Chickamauga was the battle for that objective. 

The subsequent battle of Chattanooga, which embraced 
Orchard Knob, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge, 
defeated Bragg' s purpose to regain possession of that city. 

Chattanooga was the gateway through the Cumberland 
Mountains for the Union Army to the Atlantic seaboard States. 

For the Confederates it was a railway center of immense 
importance. It occupied the intersection of nearly all their 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 9 

trunk lines. Those from Richmond through East Tennessee to 
New Orleans there crossed the lines from Memphis to Charles- 
ton, and those from Kentucky through Tennessee and Georgia 
to the Southeastern seaboard. There was only one other line 
of communication between Richmond, Atlanta, and New 
Orleans. 

THE MIDDIvE TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

Marching from Murfreesboro, Triune, and Franklin on the 
23d of June, 1863, General Rosecrans moved against Bragg, 
who was strongly fortified at Shelby ville and Tullahoma, his 
lines also occupying various gaps — Hoovers, Liberty, Bell- 
buckle, Guys, and others — in a range of rough, rocky hills 
that covered the position of his infantry, which extended from 
Shelbyville to Wartrace. Bragg's cavalry was thrown well 
north of Duck River, and extended from McMinnville on the 
east to Spring Hill on the west. Polk's corps was at Shelby- 
ville; Hardee's headquarters was at Wartrace, and his troops 
held Hoovers, Liberty, and Bellbuckle gaps. 

By brilliant strategy, with the loss of only 570 killed and 
wounded, and 13 captured and missing, the Army of the Cum- 
berland, with its 9 divisions, consisting of 20 brigades, operat- 
ing through nine days of continuous rain, maneuvered Bragg, 
with his 7 divisions, composed of 23 brigades, out of his natural 
and artificial strongholds, and forced him across the Tennessee. 
Up to that time there had been no strategic campaign to equal 
this, and it was soon to be far surpassed, except in the one 
element of loss, by the campaign to follow it. So brilliant had 
been the conception and the execution of his plans that all the 
corps commanders, headed by General Thomas, hastened to call 
on General Rosecrans and offer the warmest congratulations. 



lo The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

CAMPAIGN FOR CHATTANOOGA. 

At the close of the Tullahoma campaign Bragg occupied 
Chattanooga and the mountain passes above and below it. 
Rosecrans's army lay along the western base of the Cumberland 
Mountains, its right above Winchester and its left at McMinn- 
ville. Here General Rosecrans at once began the most vigorous 
preparations for another campaign for the occupation of Chatta- 
nooga. Because the necessities of the case compelled secrecy as 
one of the main elements of success, there was soon at Wash- 
ington a manifestation of unreasoning impatience over what was 
criticised as the inaction of the Union commander; but those 
who were on the ground know well the unceasing activity and 
energ}'- with which the work of accumulating sufficient supplies 
of food, material, and ammunition progressed, preparing the 
means for crossing the Tennessee, and obtaining the necessary 
knowledge of the mountain passes, roads, and trails by which 
the army must move. Rosecrans's supplies reached him over a 
badly equipped line of worn railroad, 113 miles in length, in an 
enemy's country, and, as can be readily understood, when the 
daily wants of a great army preparing for extended movement 
and battle are considered, the matter of accumulating a surplus 
of supplies was not the task of a day or a week. With every 
effort the railroad was not repaired until July 25, and the for- 
ward movement began on the 14th of August. 

A glance at the atlas of the Park Commission will disclose the 
great natural obstacles which lay between General Rosecrans 
and Chattanooga. As his ami)' faced toward the latter point, 
the Cumberland Mountains, with a general elevation of 1,800 
feet above their base, rose before it. The escarpment was every- 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. ii 

where precipitous, and destitute of every means of approach, 
except narrow mountain roads and trails, with the one excep- 
tion that a short railroad ran from Cowan to Tracy City on the 
summit of the range. To the eastward this range dropped 
by like precipitous and difficult slopes into the valley of the 
Sequatchie River. Beyond that stream rose the equally sharp 
cliffs of Waldens Ridge, with a general elevation of 1,300 feet 
above the plain. This fell off precipitately along the eastern 
and southern edge of the plateau into the valley of the Tennes- 
see, and overlooked it from the mouth of the Sequatchie River to 
a point far above Chattanooga. It was 50 miles as the crow 
flies from the lines of Rosecrans's army across this continuous 
mountain region to the valley of the Tennessee. This river 
was broad and deep, and presented in itself the most serious 
natural obstacle which the Union army had encountered since it 
left the Ohio River. It was 2,700 feet wide at Bridgeport, and 
1,254 feet ^t Caperton, the points where bridges were subse- 
quently thrown. 

On the left bank of the river, the stronghold of Chattanooga 
lying behind the river, and the great raiiges to the westward 
between Rosecrans's position and his own, might well seem to 
Bragg impregnable, in fact almost unassailable. First, looking 
from Chattanooga toward the west, came the lyookout range, 
rising abruptl}^ from the river to the height of 1,500 feet, and 
stretching south west wardly far into Georgia and Alabama. Its 
western precipices looked down into the narrow valley of lyOok- 
out Creek. Beyond the latter rose the equally precipitous cliffs 
of the Raccoon Mountain, the latter having the same general 
elevation as the Lookout range. The elevation of the Tennes- 
see River at Chattanooga is 634 feet. 



12 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

The gorge of the Tennessee where it breaks through these 
mountain ranges is so narrow and so thoroughly commanded 
from the heights on both sides as to render it impracticable to 
move an army to attack it from the front or river line. 

With these giant obstacles to the progress of his columns, 
most serious even if they had been within the Union lines, but 
almost insuperable when found in an enemy's territory, and 
while he was bending every energy to complete preparations 
for carrying out a brilliant plan of his own for overcoming them, 
General Rosecrans received on August 4, onl}^ ten days after his 
railroad had been repaired to the Tennessee River, a dispatch 
from Halleck, saying: 

Yoiir forces must move forward without delay. Yoii will daily report 
the movement of each corps till you cross the Tennessee River. 

He was then engaged in building boats, opening mountain 
roads, rushing the accumulation of stores, getting out material 
for 4,000 feet of bridges, preparing to leave his base carrying 
provisions for twenty-five days, and ammunition for two battles, 
and crossing three mountain ranges and a deep and broad river 
in an enemy's country, and in the face of an army. 

To this dispatch General Rosecrans replied: 

Your dispatch ordering me to move forward without delay, reporting 
the movements of each corps till I cross the Tennessee, is received. As I 
have determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and have been 
making all preparations and getting such information as ma}- enable me 
to do so without being driven back, like Hooker, I wish to know if your 
order is intended to take away my discretion as to the time and man- 
ner of moving my troops. 

To this Halleck responded: 

The orders for the advance of your army, and that it be reported daily, 
are peremptory. 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 13 

General Rosecrans immediately wrote his reply, and calling 
the corps commanders together, read the dispatches given above. 
There was no dissent from the proposition that at that stage of 
their preparations it was impossible to move. He then read his 
reply as follows, and all approved and agreed that they would 
support him: 

General HAi,r,ECK : My arrangements for beginning a continuous move- 
ment will be completed and the execution begun Monday next. We 
have information to show that crossing the Tennessee between Bridge- 
port and Chattanooga is impracticable, but not enough to show whether 
we had better cross above Chattanooga and strike Cleveland, or below 
Bridgeport and strike in their rear. The preliminar}' movement of troops 
for the two cases are very different. It is necessary to have our means of 
crossing the river completed, and our supplies provided to cross 60 miles 
of mountains and sustain ourselves during the operations of crossing and 
fighting, before we move. To obey your order literally would be to push 
our troops into the mountains on narrow and difficult roads, destitute of 
pasture and forage, and short of water, where they would not be able to 
maneuver as exigencies may demand, and would certainly cause ultimate 
delay and probable disaster. If, therefore, the movement which I pro- 
pose can not be regarded as obedience to your order, I respectfully request 
a modification of it or to be relieved from the command. 

On the following day Halleck replied as follows: 

I have communicated to you the wishes of the Government in plain and 
unequivocal terms. The objective has been stated, and you have been 
directed to lose no time in reaching it. The means you are to employ 
and the roads you are to follow are left to your own discretion. If you 
wish to promptly carry out the wishes of the Government you will not 
stop to discuss mere details. In such matters I do not interfere. 

This was answered the same day by General Rosecrans as 
follows: 

Your dispatch received. I can only repeat the assurance given before 
the issuance of the order. This army shall move with all dispatch com- 



14 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

patible with the successful execution of our work. We are pressing 
everything to bring up forage for our animals. The present rolling stock 
of the road will barely suffice to keep us day by day here, but I have 
bought 50 more freight cars, which are arriving. Will advise you daily. 

This was the last of interference from Washington. 

Ten days later, namely, on August 16, the movement to 
secure Chattanooga began. A reference to the atlas will reveal 
its strategy. 

Rosecrans had decided to cross the Tennessee in the vicinity 
of Bridgeport, and subsequently the Raccoon and Lookout 
Mountain ranges at points south of Chattanooga, and thus 
compel Bragg to evacute the place or to come out of it and fight 
for his line of communications. It is easily seen that if after 
crossing the river the enemy, warned in time, should be found 
in force on the western slopes of these ranges further progress 
in that direction would have been impossible, and a return to 
the north bank of the river obligatory. It was, therefore, neces- 
sary to wholly deceive Bragg as to the points of crossing. 

Burnside was marchmg from Kentucky into East Tennessee. 
Any apparent movement of the Army of the Cumberland in 
force in that direction would naturally lead Bragg to believe 
that a junction of the Union forces was contemplated on his 
right. 

Everything being ready, Crittenden opened the campaign 
with the Twenty-first Corps. Leaving his camps at Hillsboro, 
Manchester, and McMinnville on the i6th of August, he crossed 
the Cumberland Mountains and occupied the Sequatchie Valley 
from a point between Jasper and Dunlap to Pikeville. Van 
Cleve held the latter place, Palmer was established at Dunlap, 
and Wood at Anderson, between Dunlap and Jasper. All built 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 15 

extensive camp fires and moved about in such ways as to con- 
vey to observers from the heights the impression that the whole 
army was moving. Meantime Minty's cavalry had moved 
through Sparta and driven DibreW s cavalry eastward through 
Crossville, on to the Tennessee, at Kingston, and over it, and 
Dibrell, having come to reconnoiter, naturally got the idea that 
Rosecrans's army was coming. The crossing of the Cumber- 
land was but the first step of the imposing diversion. Though 
the mountain roads were few and very difficult, Crittenden's 
movements over them had been completed exactly on time. 
The advance over Waldens Ridge, equally difficult, though it 
was not quite as high as the main range, was immediately 
undertaken. Minty, on the extreme left, appeared on the Ten- 
nessee more than 30 miles above Blythe's ferrj^ where he made 
most energetic conmiotion. Hazeu reached the river in the 
vicinity of Dallas. Two brigades were strung out along the 
edge of the cliffs on the top of Waldens Ridge, where they 
overlooked Blythe's ferry, and could be seen from the other 
side of the river. Minty swept down the valley of the Tennes- 
see to near Chattanooga. Wilder and Wagner also appeared in 
the valley. While a show of building boats was made in the 
small streams about Blythe's ferry. Wilder, on August 21, 
from the heights of Stringers Ridge, opposite Chattanooga, 
opened fire on the town with artillery. Bragg was thoroughh' 
deceived. Forrest was ordered far up the Tennessee to Kings- 
ton to watch for the expected crossing. Biickrier was ordered 
from East Tennessee toward Blythe's ferry. 

As may be supposed, Wilder' s cannonading produced the 
wildest excitement in Chattanooga. The rolling stock of the 
railroads was hastened out of reach. The depots of supplies 



1 6 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

were moved out of the range of the unexpected bombardment. 
D. H. HilVs corps was hurried off to guard the river above, and 
other heavy forces were moved in the same direction. Every- 
thing done by Bragg was based upon the idea that Rosecrans 
was moving in force to points on the river above the city. 

Meantime the real movement was going on quietly 60 miles 
by the mountain roads, in the opposite direction, beyond the 
Cumberland Mountains, and also in the vicinity of Bridgeport 
and Stevenson. A force of cavalry for the purposes of observa- 
tion, and to convey the idea by quick movements that Rosecrans 
was feigning below, while really expecting to cross above the 
city, was sent as far westward as Decatur. Thus Rosecrans' s 
front, when he reached the Tennessee River, extended from 
Kingston to Decatur along the river through a hundred miles 
of mountain region and more than a hundred of low country 
beyond, and in spite of the natural difficulties every part of the 
plan was working with precision. 

Thomas and McCook on the right moved at the same time 
with Crittenden. Reynolds, of Thomas's corps, had marched in 
advance and repaired the roads by way of University and down 
the eastern slope of the mountain to Jasper. Brannan followed 
him, and both were at first kept well out of sight of the river. 
Baird and Negley came down nearer to Bridgeport and McCook 
descended back of Stevenson. With the exception of Sheridan 
at Bridgeport, all were kept well out of sight from the enemy's 
cavalr}' on the left bank. 

Sheridan alone made a show of his presence and openly began 
the construction of a trestle through the shoal water in order 
to lessen the length of the floating bridge. As this was without 
a decided show of strength it deepened the impression that the 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 17 

movements on this wing- were the feint and those toward the 
upper river the real move. In fact, after watching Sheridan's 
trestle building for a while from the other side of the river, 
Anderson's brigade of infantry, the only infantry force available 
to oppose a passage of the river, was withdrawn and sent to 
Chattanooga. 

The bridge for Caperton's ferry was brought down on a 
train, which was halted out of sight, and a road cut for its trans- 
portation through the woods to a point near its destination, 
where the troops which were to \z.y it were drilled in their work. 

Early on the 29th of August pontoons, each carrying 30 men, 
were brought out of the woods near Caperton's, rushed across 
an open field, launched, and quickly rowed to the opposite shore. 
The Confederate cavalry pickets were driven off and a brigade 
held the south bank. The bridge was promptly laid. Davis 
was soon over, and then McCook's entire corps, with cavalry, 
started promptly for 'Valley Head, 40 miles down the Lookout 
range. Reynolds collected boats at Shellmound. Brannan had 
built rafts and canoes at the mouth of Battle Creek. The long 
bridge was successfully laid at Bridgeport, and before Bragg 
had recovered from his surprise, in fact before he had compre- 
hended the extent of the movement, Rosecrans, with two corps, 
was over the river and moving toward his communications. 

As soon as the crossing of McCook and Thomas was assured, 
Crittenden marched with celerity down the Sequatchie Valley 
toward the bridges and was soon across the Tennessee with the 
main body and advancing on the left of it directly toward 
Chattanooga. 

This crossing of the Tennessee was a great feat. The bridges 
were not sufficient for the army. Reynolds gathered small boats 
2 7092—02 2 



1 8 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

and improvised his own means of crossing. Brannan's men cut 
out canoes from immense poplars and launched them in Battle 
Creek out of sight. Some of them would hold 50 men. They 
also built rafts, one of them large enough to carry one piece of 
artillery. These, with an abandoned rebel pontoon boat, con- 
stituted Brannan's flotilla. When the signal was given the 
whole swept out from behind the bushes which concealed the 
mouth of Battle Creek and made for the opposite shore. The 
rebel pickets withdrew and the crossing was secured. Then 
all his" men who could swim, piling their guns, clothing, and 
accouterments on a few fence rails, pushed these before them 
and thus gained the opposite bank. Later, Wilder swam his 
mounted brigade across the river above Chattanooga and joined 
Crittenden south of the city. 

But this crossing, and the grand diversion which made it 
possible, were only the preliminary and by no means the for- 
midable parts of the movement. To complete it, Rosecrans 
was to cut loose from his base, carry twent3^-five days' supplies 
and sufficient ammunition for two battles, cross two precipitous 
and difficult mountain ranges wholly within the enemy's terri- 
tory, by widel^^ separated roads, these being the only trails prac- 
ticable for wheels, and their passes presumably strengthened and 
defended, and, after crossing the last range at widely separated 
points, to descend into the valle^^ in the rear of the enemy's 
stronghold, and be prepared for battle or an}' other contingencies 
which might arise on this distant and isolated theater of action. 

When Bj'agg discovered the real point of crossing and the 
lines of actual movement it was too late to recall the forces 
dispatched up the Tennessee or to post columns of sufficient 
strength on the slopes before Rosecrans to impede his advance 



The Campaign for Chattanooga, 19 

in force. How strong the positions thus turned by the Union 
forces were will appear from the statement that so precipitous 
and otherwise difficult were the roads over these ranges that at 
several of them it required a day and a night for a division with 
its artillery and reduced trains to make the ascent, and equal 
time for the dCvScent. 

The Union commander had delayed his movement until the 
corn was ripe, in order that it might not be necessarj' to carry 
grain for his animals, which would have largely increased his 
trains — so careful and thoughtful was he in every detail of 
preparation. 

Bragg' s failure to resist in the vicinity of Rosecrans's cross- 
ings and at the crossings of Raccoon Mountain was due in part 
to the fact that even after he knew that the heads of columns 
were over the river he was still inclined to look upon their 
movements as a feint, and to regard the real point of danger to 
be above the city. Rosecrans, even after crossing, sought suc- 
cessfully to strengthen such impressions in Bragg' s mind. He 
directed Wagner's, Wilder's, and Minty's brigades to report to 
Hazen, and with this force, some 7,000 strong, the latter was 
ordered to make a conspicuous show of crossing the river far 
above Chattanooga. This active and efficient officer admirably 
executed his orders. By extended fires along Waldens Ridge, 
by marchings and countermarchings, by moving his artillery 
continuoUvSly across openings in sight from the opposite bank, 
by buglers at widely separated points, and other similar devices, 
he easily created the belief that an army was encamped on the 
right bank intending to cross. 

With the exception of this force, all of Rosecrans's army was 
south of the river on September 4, and on the move. The right 



20 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

was already well on its way. On the 6th his army had de- 
scended from Raccoon Mountain and occupied the valley between 
that range and the western slope of L,ookout from a point 7 
miles from Chattanooga to Valley Head, 42 miles from the city. 
The next day McCook and Thomas began to ascend lyookout 
at points respectively 42 and 26 miles from Chattanooga. On 
the 8th McCook's troops were in motion down the eastern slope 
of the mountain toward Alpine, and Thomas was descending 
through Stevens and Fricks gaps. Crittenden, from near 
Wauhatchie, had pushed small portions of his command up 
mere mountain trails, and on the 9th these gained position 
where they could look down upon Chattanooga. They saw no 
flags, and soon discovered that Bragg had evacuated the city. 
The day before, Wagner, still watching from the north bank of 
the river, had reported to Rosecrans that the enemy was leav- 
ing. The news came in the night, and Rosecrans ordered 
Crittenden to ascertain the. situation. His detachments on the 
mountain had already discovered that the city was deserted. 
Crittenden was at once ordered to march around the north point 
of Lookout, and follow Bragg toward Ringgold. At night of 
the 9th Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions were established at 
Rossville, 5 miles south of Chattanooga, Woods following on 
the loth. 

Thus, in three weeks from the time his diversion toward 
Bragg' s right began, and in five days from the time his army 
was over the river, Rosecrans had repeated the Tullahoma cam- 
paign on a far greater scale, and in the face of much more for- 
midable obstacles, and absolutely without fighting, except as 
Minty had been slightly engaged with Dibrell near Sparta in 
the outset of the movement, had forced Bf^agg from the moun- 
tain stronghold of Chattanooga, the objective of the campaign. 



The Campaign foi^ Chattanooga. 21 

General Meigs, who came from Washington to Chattanooga 
after its final occupation by the Union army, and spent some 
days in studying the movements by which it had been secured, 
said: 

It is not only the greatest operation in our war, but a great thing when 
compared with any war. 

But the occupation of Chattanooga, in a military sense, was 
not accomplished by leaving one brigade in it. Bragg had onl}' 
withdrawn to save his communications and supplies, to confront 
the Union army as it descended the lyOokout range, and to await 
the reenforcements he knew to be hastening from Virginia, from 
Mobile, and from Mississippi. The battle for Chattanooga was 
yet to be fought. Bragg had retired with deliberation. He 
established his headquarters at lyafayette, behind Pigeon Moun- 
tain, but his rear guard never passed far beyond L,ee & 
Gordon's mill. 

The news as published in the North that Ro.secrans's troops 
were in Chattanooga, and that he had pushed out after the 
retreating Bragg made a tremendous impression there. It was 
accepted as a capture and a militarj' occupation of that long- 
coveted stronghold. It is true it was occupied, but not in a 
military sense, since the Union army had not been brought into 
it or concentrated between it and the enem3^ It was not even 
a temporary depot of supplies. The rations, forage, and ammu- 
nition of the army were in the trains of the several corps. The 
nearest was 13 miles distant and the others 30 to 50 miles dis- 
tant by the roads it was necessary for them to follow. 

The belief that Chattanooga had been occupied in force 
caused misconception, which was widespread, that the Arm)^ of 
the Cumberland had occupied Chattanooga in force, and, march- 



22 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

ing out to attack Bragg, had been defeated by the latter at 
Chickamauga, and driven back in disorder into Chattanooga. 

But, instead, Chickamauga was the battle for Chattanooga, 
fought b)^ Rosecrans while on the way to take possession of 
it in force, and while he was concentrating his arm}^ between 
Bragg and that city, the objective of the Union campaign. 
The battle was not for the Chickamauga woods, but for. the 
passes behind them which controlled the way to Chattanooga. 
These were secured as the immediate results of the battle, and 
the successful occupation of Chattanooga in the military sense 
followed — an occupation which lasted till the close of the war. 

The Army of the Cumberland, except as Crittenden had 
observed it from lyookout Mountain, and left one brigade in it, 
had not even seen Chattanooga until the second day after the 
battle of Chickamauga. 

In connection with the fact of Crittenden's unopposed move- 
ment into Chattanooga, another point of general misapprehen- 
sion arose, which, through the j^ears, has formed a basis for 
criticism of General Rosecrans's brilliant strategy. Why did 
not Rosecrans face Thomas and McCook about in the valley 
west of lyookout, where their movements would have been 
concealed, and hurr}^ them after Crittenden into Chattanooga? 

Rosecrans replied that it wassimplj^ because with McCook' s ad- 
vance nearly 50 miles from Chattanooga by the roads west of L,ook- 
out, and Thomas's head of column over Lookout and Missionary 
Ridge, full 25 miles awa}', to attempt to withdraw them over the 
mountains in full view of the enemy would have left Bragg free 
to fall with his whole force upon Crittenden and crush him before 
either McCook or Thomas could recross lyookout and reach him. 
In such a plan for concentration the chances would have been in 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 23 

favor of Bi^agg' s success. Besides, the shortest and surest, in 
fact the only practicable, line of concentration looking to the 
safety of the widely-separated corps was through a movement 
to the left along the eastern bases of Lookout and Missionar}^ 
Ridge. 

After the army had crossed IvOokout the dispatches from the 
right were to the effect that Bragg was retreating on Rome. 
At the same time General Halleck telegraphed from Washington 
that it was reported there that a part of Bragg' s arni}^ was reen- 
forcing Lee, and that it was important to ascertain the truth of 
the report as soon as possible. General Rosecrans thereupon 
ordered pursuit. Any other course, previous to a.scertaining that 
Bragg was not retreating, would have been open to criticism. 
Thomas, who was ordered forward to Lafayette, soon found the 
enemy in strong force in the gaps of Pigeon Mountain and 
throughout McLemores Cove. 

Rosecrans also quickly discovered that Bragg' s right was held 
near Lee & Gordons mill in contact with Crittenden, that 
Lo7ig street was about to reenforce him, and that Bragg was 
evidently concentrating for battle. 

Turning from projected pursuit, every energy was exerted to 
concentrate the army and hold it between Bragg and Chatta- 
nooga. On the 1 7th of September McCook had reached Thomas, 
and Thomas moved toward Crittenden. It was this movement of 
Rosecrans for concentrating on Crittenden's position near Lee & 
Gordon's that led to the battle of Chickamauga. Bragg, having 
been heavily reenforced, started at the same time from Lafayette 
to interpose between Rosecrans and Chattanooga, the Union 
objective of the whole campaign. 



24 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

ORGANIZATION OF THB ARMIES. 

The Union Army, Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, was composed of 
the following corps and divisions of the Army of the Cumberland: 

Fourteenth Corps, Gen. George H. Thomas. 

Divisions — Baird, Negley, Brannan, Reynolds. 
Twentieth Corps, Gen. A. McD. McCook. 

Divisions — Davis, 'Johnson, Sheridan. 
Twenty-first Corps, Gen. T. L. Crittenden. 

Divisions — Wood, Palmer. Van Cleve. 
Reserve Corps, Gen. Gordon Granger. 

Divisions — Steedman, D. McCook's brigade of Morgan's. 
Cavalry Corps, Gen. R. B. Mitchell. 

Divisions— E. McCook, Crook. 

The Confederate Army, Gen. Braxton Bragg, was composed 
as follows: 

Buckner's corps. Gen. S. B. Buckner. 

Divisions— Stewart, Preston. 
Hill's corps, Gen. D. H. Hill. 

Division"? — Cleburne, Breckinridge. 
Dongstreet's (Hood's) corps, Gen. James Dongstreet. 

Divisions — McDaws, Hood, Bushrod Johnson. 
Polk's corps, Gen. lyconidas Polk. 

Divisions — Cheatham, Hindman. 
Walker's (reserve) corps. Gen. W. H. T. Walker. 

Divisions — Walker (Gist), Diddell. 
Forrest's corps (cavalry), Gen. Nathan B. Forrest. 

Divisions — Armstrong, Pegram. 
Wheeler's corps (cavalry), Gen. Joseph Wheeler. 

Divisions — Wharton, Martin. 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 25 

PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS, SEPTEMBER l8. 

Both armies moved toward the Chickamauga field from the 
southwest, Bragg from east of Pigeon Mountain and down the 
Chickamauga Valley toward its fords and bridges, and Rose- 
crans from Mclyemores Cove, which lies between Lookout and 
Pigeon mountains (see map) by way of Crawfish Spring. 

During September 18 the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, 
with the cavalry on their right and front toward the Chicka- 
mauga and two divisions of the Twenty-first Corps on the left, 
were concentrating in McLemores Cove, the Fourteenth in the 
vicinity of Pond Spring and the Twentieth in front of Stevens 
Gap, and cautiously moving to the left toward the right division 
of Crittenden's corps, his left division (Wood) being in position 
at lyce & Gordon's mill. Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry 
was at Alexander's bridge and Minty's brigade of cavalry east 
of Reed's bridge observing the road thence to Ringgold. 

Gordon Granger's troops were at McAfees Church with 
forces thrown forward toward the Chickamauga, observing the 
road from that point to Ringgold. 

bragg's order for battle. 

On the night of September 17 Bragg issued his orders for 
battle. Hood' s corps was to. march- early on the i8th from 
Ringgold, cross at Reed's bridge, and sweep up the Chickamauga 
toward Crittenden's position, the left of the Union Army at Lee 
& Gordon's mill. Polk's corps was to demonstrate in front of 
this latter position, and, if found practicable, cross and attack. 
Walker's corps was to cross at Alexander's bridge and join 



26 The Cmnpaign for Chattanooga. 

Hood in the movement toward Crittenden. Biickner's corps 
was to cross at Dalton's ford and join the general movement. 

Thus Bragg' s plan of battle was to gain the Lafayette road 
between Rosecrans and Chattanooga, drive Crittenden back on 
the Union center in McLemores Cove, and the whole into the 
mountains from which the center and right had emerged. 

At 8 o'clock on the morning of September ig Bragg' s plan 
had progressed to the formation of his lines of battle, with the 
left resting on the high ground near Hall's ford and facing the 
left of Crittenden's line at Scott's, north of Lee & Gordon's, 
the distance between the lines being only i,ooo yards. 

This concentration of Bragg for battle had been thus accom- 
plished: Btcshrod Johnsofi, in command of his own and such 
portions of Hood's {McLaw' s) division as had arrived at Ring- 
gold, marched from that place early on the i8th to force a 
crossing at Reed's bridge. Upon reaching Pea Vine Creek, east 
of Pea Vine Ridge, about ii o'clock, he was compelled by 
Minty's cavalry to deplo}^ his lines, and was thereafter so vig- 
orously opposed that he was not able to cross the river until 
3.30 p. m. Meantime, Wilder, at Alexander's, had prevented 
the crossing of Walker's corps, dismantled the bridge, thus 
obliging it to proceed to Lambert's ford, a mile and a half 
below, where it crossed toward evening and during the night. 
Hood arrived at Jay's mill at 4 p. m., took command, and 
moved to the high ground east of Viniard's, Minty and Wilder 
falling back before him, and, assisted by Dick's brigade of Van 
Cleve's division, holding him in check at that point. 

During the night of the 18th and early morning of the 19th 
Buckncr' s corps crossed the river at Dalton's and Thedford's 
fords. Preston's division formed on the left and Stewart's on 



The Cainpaigii for Chattanooga. 27 

the right, both in column of brigades. Walker' s two divisions 
were moving up from the direction of lyambert's ford to the 
support of Hood'' s Hne on the right, and Cheatham' s division of 
five brigades was taking position as the reserve of the left. 
Hindmayi' s division was still east of the Chickamauga, opposite 
Lee & Gordon's, and HilV s corps was opposite Glass's mill. 
Wheeler's corps of cavalry was operating at that point and still 
farther up the stream. For7'est had been sent at an early hour 
with three brigades from Alexander's bridge to the vicinity of 
Jay's mill, a part of one brigade proceeding to Ringgold Bridge, 
to guard the right and rear of Bragg' s lines against any move- 
ment from the direction of McAfees Church. 

At 8 o'clock artillery firing was in progress between a Con- 
federate battery near Hall's ford and a Union battery on Crit- 
tenden's line at Scott's. The orders for attack were being 
delivered along Bragg' s line when desultory firing, which began 
about 7.30, became continuous toward Jay's mill, several miles 
to the right and rear, and suspended the intended forward move- 
ment until its meaning could be ascertained. Very soon a 
report came from Forrest of a heavy attack upon him, and calls 
for infantry. He had already found Wilson' s and Ector's bri- 
gades and taken them to his lines, and at Forrest' s request 
Walker's remaining division {Liddell' s) was hurried to the 
•ground of unexpected fighting. 

This unforeseen attack upon Forrest's force at Jay's mill 
resulted from a night march of Rosecrans's troops in Mclvcmores 
Cove to interpose between Bragg and Chattanooga. Starting 
from the vicinity of Pond Spring late in the afternoon of the 
1 8th, the Fourteenth Corps, followed later by the Twentieth, 
marched by wa}' of Crawfish Spring and Widow Glenn's and 



28 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

arrived at Kelly's soon after daylight. Without waiting for 
breakfast Brannan's division was sent north to McDonald's, 
where it turned east toward Jay's mill. At 7.30 Croxton's 
brigade became severely engaged on the slope just west of the 
mill, and at 8 o'clock Van Derveer's brigade struck the enemj^ 
to the left of Croxton and both were continuously and heavih' 
engaged for nearly five hours. Connell's brigade came to their 
support, and its battery rendered vital service. Forrest, reen- 
forced by Walker' s and Lidde/l's divisions, appeared on the flank 
of Croxton and caused him to move by his right flank. An 
attempt by Forrest to turn Van Derveer's left failed in disastrous 
repulse. Van Derveer by rapid movement facing his brigade 
about, wheeling it by the rear rank, and rushing two batteries 
to the crest north of him, there met Forrest, charging dismounted 
in four ranks, and overwhelmed him. This ended the fighting 
for the day on that portion of the line. 

Croxton, hard pressed by Wilson's brigade of Walker' s divi- 
sion, was relieved by the advance of Baird from Kelly's. Baird, 
in succession, was taken in flank and thrown into much confu- 
sion by the arrival of LiddelV s division dispatched b}?- Bragg 
from his reserves. Walthall, of this divi.sion, captured the bat- 
tery of J. H. King's brigade of regulars, dispersing the brigade; 
and Govan captured the battery of Scribner's brigade, and forced 
Starkweather's brigade to the rear. King's battery was soon 
after recaptured bj^ the Ninth Ohio, charging from the right of 
Van Derveer's line. 

LiddeWs troops were, in turn, taken in flank by the advance of 
Johnson's division of McCook's corps from near Poe's on the 
Lafayette road,, and obliged to retreat in confusion to avoid 
capture. 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 29 

By noon Bragg' s plan of battle was entirely destroyed, and 
his divisions, as well as those of the fast-arriving Union columns, 
were being hurried in succession to the new field of battle forced 
on him by the night march of Rosecrans's army, which had 
thrust the Union lines far beyond Bragg' s position and between 
it and Chattanooga, giving Rosecrans possession of the Lafayette 
road, which was the main and direct route to Chattanooga. 

Following Walker' s divisions, Bragg dispatched Cheatham' s 
four Ijrigades from his reserve to the right. Cheatham first 
struck Johnson north of the road from Brotherton's to Jaj^'s 
mill and east of Brock's. After two hours' fighting Cheatham^ 
assisted by a small force of Forrest' s cavalry, was forced back to 
the high ground south of Winfrey's, and Johnson advanced his 
line to that house. Johnson had been assisted on his right by 
Palmer's division .sent to Thomas by Crittenden from the vicin- 
ity of Lee & Gordon's. This division formed at Poe's, on the' 
Lafayette road, and advanced to Brock's in echelon by brigades, 
.striking a portion of Cheatham' s line and becoming heavily 
engaged. 

Two brigades of Van Cleve's division followed Palmer from 
Crittenden's position, formed at Brotherton's, and pu.slied east- 
ward into the forest on the right of Palmer. One of these 
(S. Beatty's)captured the batter)^ of the left brigade ( Wright' s) 
of C/ieat/iam' s division, and repulsed the brigade. 

At this juncture Stewart's division, detached from B^agg' s 
original line, arrived in front of Van Cleve and Palmer, both 
of these divisions having been reenforced by troops of Reynolds's 
division, Turchin's brigade assisting Palmer and E. King's 
brigade joining Van Cleve. 



3Q The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

At 4 p. m. Stewart's division liad driven Dick's and S. Beatty's 
brigades of Van Cleve's division, and two regiments of King's 
brigade, across the Lafayette road south of Brotherton's, and 
assisted by Bushrod Johnson'' s division, which had crossed the 
lyafaj'ette road south of Brotherton's, Van Cleve was pushed 
still farther west and retired beyond the Crawfish Spring road. 
Bate' s brigade penetrated the Union line at Poe's, and Clayton'' i 
brigade at Brotherton's. Bate was soon repulsed by the fire of 
20 guns and supporting infantry hastily assembled by Reynolds 
in the north end of the Poe field. The arrival in the Dyer field 
of Brannan's division from the left, and Negley's from the 
extreme right, quicklj^ restored the Union center. 

From noon to sundown a fierce engagement was in progress 
in the Viniard fields. Just before noon Davis's division of 
McCook's corps, following Johnson, arrived at Rosecrans's head- 
quarters at Widow Glenn's, and was sent eastward to Viniard' s 
with orders to develop the Confederate left. Carlin's brigade 
moved directl}^ east from a point south of Widow Glenn's, crossed 
the Lafayette road and entered the Viniard fields, Wilder' s 
brigade being in line west of the road along the western edge 
of the fields. Heg's brigade of Davis's division moved to the 
left of Widow Glenn's, crossed the Lafaj^ette road and moved 
southeastwardly through the forest until its advance was stopped 
by Bushrod Johnson s troops in position on the first ridge east of 
Viniard's. Johnson' s awdHood's divisions, with Trdgg's brigade 
oi Preston s division, then advanced upon the Union forces, and 
fierce fighting followed, with alternate advances across the Da- 
faj^ette road and repulses. Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve, which 
had been left near Dee & Gordon's, came early to the assist- 
ance of Carlin. At 4 p. m. Harker's and Buell's brigades of 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 31 

Wood's division arrived from L,ee & Gordon's, followed a little 
later by Bradley's and Ivaiboldt's brigades of Sheridan. There 
were then seven brigades engaged on each side. Harker passed 
beyond Viniard's and with his right became engaged east of the 
I^afayette road to the left of Trigg, while two of his regiments 
crossed to the west side and attacked Biishrod Johnson's left 
from the rear and dispersed it as it was attacking the right of 
Van Cleve's line in the south end of the Brotherton field. 

The fighting at Viniard's ended by the Confederates with- 
drawing at sundown to the forest east of Viniard's. Only a 
portion of these movements are shown on the model for want 
of room. 

At sundown fighting had ceased on every part of the field. 
Rosecrans held the Lafayette road, and his lines were solidly 
between Bragg and Chattanooga. 

General Thomas had selected a new line, skirting the eastern 
edge of the Kelly field, nearer the Lafayette road, and as 
Johnson with Baird on his left was about to withdraw to it a 
fierce attack was opened in the dusk upon their lines. Cle- 
burne' s division had been brought from the other side of the 
Chickamauga and formed along the road from Alexander's 
bridge to Jay's mill, with his right resting at the mill. Sup- 
ported b}' two brigades of Cheatham, he fell upon Johnson and 
Baird and a desperate fight ensued in the darkness, lasting over 
an hour, when the Union divisions slowly withdrew from under 
fire to their new positions at the Kelly field. The arrows in 
front of Cleburne and Johnson indicate the theater of this night 
attack. 

During the night the lines of each army were rearranged. 



32 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

THK SECOND DAY AT CHICKAMAUGA. 

Sunday morning, September 20, the lines of the two armies 
were arranged as follows: 

Baird's division extended around the northeast corner of the 
Kelly field, his left refused. Skirting this field on the east, 
next came the divisions of Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds, the 
right brigade of the latter being in echelon west of the Lafayette 
road, its right reaching the Poe field. Brannan's front covered 
the Poe field at its western edge. Next came Negley along the 
western line of the Brotherton field. Major-General Thomas 
was in command of the whole of this line. During the night 
the Union right at Viniard's and Lee & Gordon's had been 
brought to the high ground west of the Crawfish Spring road. 
Wilder' s brigade was the right of this line west and south of 
Widow Glenn's; part of Sheridan's division was next on the left. 
Then in succession came Davis, Wood, and Van Cleve, the lat- 
ter reaching to Vittetoe's. At an earl 3^ hour Davis was moved 
forward to the right of Negley, and Sheridan was established in 
front of Widow Glenn's. 

At 8 o'clock Negley was ordered from the right of Thomas's 
line to the extreme left, where that officer was attempting to 
strengthen it against a flank attack. Wood, with Barnes's 
brigade of Van Cleve 's division, was moved forward to relieve 
Negley, and after considerable delay occupied the line he 
vacated. The Union front was protected around the Kelly 
field by a line of logs and such stumps and stones as could be 
gathered. The rest of the line was rudely protected hy rails 
and such material as could be hastily gathered. There were no 
rifle pits. 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 33 

The Confederate line was wholl}^ east of the I^afayette road, 
its right and center being in close contact with the Union line. 
Beginning on the right of its infantry, Breckinridge' s division 
confronted Baird, two brigades and a half of his line extending 
beyond Baird's left. Two divisions of Forrest's cavalry, one 
operating dismounted, still further prolonged the Confederate 
line. Cleburne'' s division was on the left of Breckinridge, then 
in succession on the front line came Stezvart, Buskrod Johnson, 
Hindman, and Preston, the whole of the latter division extend- 
ing beyond the Union right. 

Walker's corps of two divisions was in reserve in rear of Breck- 
inridge, Cheatham with five brigades in rear of Clebnrne and 
Steiuart, and Law' s and Kershaw' s divisions were in column 
just in rear oi Johnson' s line in front of Brotherton's, but the 
latter two are omitted from the model to avoid crowding. 

The Union line was therefore overlapped hy infantry on both 
flanks, and the Confederates had five divisions of infantry in 
reserve, and two divisions of cavalry between its right and Gor- 
don Granger's three brigades at McAfee's Church. 

Bragg had eleven brigades of infantry which were not engaged 
the first day, while Rosecrans had but six, counting Granger. 
Bragg had fifteen brigades of infantry as reserves, while Rose- 
crans had only Wilder 's brigade in rear of Widow Glenn's, and 
two brigades of Van Cleve near Vittetoe's, and all of these were 
sent immediately to the front line when the battle opened in 
their vicinity. 

Longstreet had arrived in person during the night. He was 
placed in command of the left wing, and Polk was assigned to 
the right wing. 

27092 — 02 3 



34 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

Bragg had ordered a general attack at daylight to begin on 
his right, to be taken up by divisions in succession to the left. 
A heavy fog and other causes delayed Breckinjidge's forward 
movement until after 9 o'clock. In advancing, his left brigade 
{Hehn's) struck Baird's left, protected by log works, and was 
shattered. Helm being mortally wounded; the right of the 
brigade gained the Lafayette road. The other brigades of 
Breckinridge' s division reached the Lafayette road, drove back 
J. Beatty of Negley, wheeled to the south and entered the Kellj' 
field and the woods west of it, full in Baird's rear. Here he 
was met and repulsed by the brigades of Stanle}^ Van Derveer, 
and Willich, the reserves of Negle3^ Brannan, and Johnson, 
respectively. 

Cleburne and Stewart next assaulted and were repulsed. Cle- 
burne made a second assault with the same result. Walker' s 
divisions attacked Baird at noon and were badly broken. The 
assaults on this line continued vigorous but unsuccessful till after 
2 p. m. General Bragg ordered a combined assault for 3 o'clock, 
but the lines could not be reorganized in time to deliver it until 
6 o'clock, when Reynolds and Palmer had already been with- 
drawn, and Johnson and Baird had been ordered to follow. 

At II. 15 Longstreet moved his center in front of Brotherton's 
forward, his three divisions of Johnson, Law, and Kershaw, the 
latter two not shown on the model, in column, its center having 
a depth of five brigades. At that moment Wood's division was 
being moved to the left and had partially gained the rear of 
Brannan, when Johnson' s division, the head of Long street' s 
column, forced its way into and through the opening. While 
Davis was attempting to close the gap left by Wood, Sheridan 
was also rushed from Widow Glenn's to the left, and while 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. ;^^ 

moving both were attacked by Hindnian in front, while the 
flanks of both were assailed, Sheridan's by Hindman, and 
Davis's by Johnson. These two Union divisions, thus broken 
off, were forced over the high ground to the west and off the 
field. Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden were caught in this 
break of the right and went to Chattanooga. This left General 
Thomas in command on the field. Wilder, from the heights 
beyond Widow Glenn's, had charged the left of Hindman and 
driven it east of the lyafayette road. He had then moved 
westward into Chattanooga Valley. Davis returned to the field 
at sundown. Sheridan moved through McFarlands Gap to 
Rossville, and thence marched toward Thomas, reaching Clouds 
at dark, returning by Thomas's order to Rossville later. Parts 
of Negley, Van Cleve, and Wood were thrown into confusion 
by the break at the center and left the field in much disorder. 

Stanley's brigade rallied at the Snodgrass House, Brannan 
withdrew his line to that position. Harker's Brigade, of Wood, 
returned to the Dyer field, threw his line in front of Loyi^streef s 
column then moving toward Snodgrass hill, repulsed Law's 
division, delayed Kcj'shazv's following it, and finally took posi- 
tion on Stanley's left at the Snodgrass House. 

The four divisions around the Kelly field stood fast. Soon 
after i o'clock Long street began his assaults on Snodgrass hill 
Y^iWv Kershaw' s ^ Hindman' s, and yi^/^w^w/'^ divisions. About 2 
o'clock the Confederates had passed over the hill to Brannan's 
right and gained the valley in his rear. At that moment Steed- 
man's division (Whitaker's and Mitchell's brigades) under Gor- 
don. Granger, arrived from McAfees Church, drove the enemy 
from Brannan's rear and tight, carried the ridge, and extended 
Brannan's right three-fourths of a mile to the heights over- 



36 The Catnpaign for Chattanooga. 

looking Vittetoe's. Van Derveer's brigade arrived immediately 
after from the Kelly field and strengthened Braniian's right, and 
Hazen's brigade was brought from Palmer's line at the Kelly 
field and took position on Harker's left. 

The Kelly field line, with its four divisions, formed Thomas's 
left, the Snodgrass hill line, with five brigades and some frag- 
ments of regiments, his right. Dan McCook's brigade had 
been left by Granger on the heights northwest of and overlook- 
ing Baird's left. On his way from McAfees Church to Snod- 
grass hill, Steedman had retaken the Union hospital at Cloud's 
Spring, which had been captured about noon hy ForresVs cavalry. 

Longstreet had eleven brigades for his assaults on Snodgrass 
hill. These continued without intermission until sundown. 
At 3 o'clock Longstreet had asked Bragg " for some troops of 
the right wing, but was informed by him that they had been 
beaten back so badly that they could be of no service to me." 
(See Long street' s report.) 

Snodgrass hill was not carried, and the battle ended at that 
position at dusk. 

Toward sunset Bragg had so far succeeded in his plan of bat- 
tle as to command the Lafayette road beyond the left of the 
Union Army, LiddelP s division {Govan's and WalthalV s bri- 
gades) having advanced to it at McDonald's. General Thomas, 
under earlier orders from General Rosecrans, and in order to 
reestablish his lines between Bragg and Chattanooga, then 
decided to withdraw his army through Macfarland's Gap to 
Rossville, and there confront Bragg with a new line. 

This was accomplished in good order, except that Johnson's 
and Baird's divisions, being attacked at the time of withdraw- 
ing, were thrown into considerable confusion, l)Ut order was 
restored after reaching the forest west of their positions. 



The Cainpaig7t for Chattanooga. 7,j 

Upon reaching Rossville the Union Army was established in 
Rossville Gap, upon Missionary Ridge on each side of it, and 
across the valley to lyookout Mountain. It remained in this 
position between Bragg and Chattanooga throughout Septem- 
ber 2 1 , and during the night withdrew unmolested to the citj- . 

Bragg followed on the 2 2d, and ordered a general attack on 
the city for the morning of the 23d. Slight skirmishing devel- 
oped the fact that Rosecrans's lines were well intrenched and 
too strong for attack. Bragg therefore formed his lines about 
the city from the river at the foot of Lookout Mountain to the 
river above the city, possessed himself of the point of lyookout 
Mountain and lyookout Valley, and thus of the river line of 
supplies, and sat down to starve out his enem5^ 

OPERATIONS ABOUT CHATTANOOGA. 

Chattanooga speedily became a formidable fortified camp. 
For a few days Rosecrans held L,ookout Mountain, but with- 
drew from it because it would require an extension of his right 
for 3 miles to hold it, and this line would have been " in air." 
Besides, to retain it would not have saved the river line of sup- 
plies, since Bragg would simply have needed to establish a 
force on an}"^ point below overlooking the river. 

Both armies were reorganized after reaching Chattanooga. 
The Twentieth and Twentj'-first Corps of the Union Army were 
consolidated into the Fourth, McCook and Crittenden being 
relieved, and Gordon Granger assigned the new command. 
The Reserve Corps was incorporated in the Fourteenth Corps. 

The divisions of the Fourth Corps were Palmer, Sheridan, 
and Wood. Those of the Fourteenth were Johnson, Davis, and 
Baird. 



38 The Campaign for Chattauooga. 

Bragg' s infantry comprised three corps — Breckinridge's and 
Hardee's each of four divisions, and Lo7ig street' s of two. 
Breckinridge's divisions were Stewart, Bate, B. Johnson, and 
Hindman {Anderson^. Hardee's divisions were ClieatJiam, Cle- 
burne, Stevenson, and Walker. Longstreet' s divisions were 
McLazv's and Hood's. His corps held Lookout Valley, the 
mountain, and the line east of it to Chattanooga Creek, until 
after the battle of Wauhatchie, when on November 4 his corps 
was dispatched to Knoxville. 

Neither army retained its cavalry at Chattanooga, except 
that Long's brigade remained with Rosecrans. 

The Union Army was supplied by a wagon haul of 60 miles 
over mountain roads from Bridgeport. Heavy rains in October 
made it extremely difficult to supply the army, and for a time 
the troops were on half rations or less. 

Soon after the battle of Chickamauga the Eleventh and 
Twelfth corps, under the command of Hooker, were sent from 
the Army of the Potomac, reaching Bridgeport September 30. 

General Rosecrans had devised a plan for reopening the river 
line of supplies by seizing Brown's ferry from Chattanooga, 
and bringing Hooker forward into Lookout Valley. The 
execution of the plan waited the completion of boats for the 
necessary bridge, and when they were rea'd}' Wheeler's raid 
north of the river caused still further delay. Orders for the 
movement were given on October 19, General Rosecrans on 
that day selecting the point for throwing the bridge. On 
returning to headquarters he found orders relieving him and 
putting General Thomas in command. The latter, as his first 
order, repeated Rosecrans' s instructions to Hooker to prepare to 
come forward into Lookout Valley. 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 39 

General Grant arrived October 23, and at once approved the 
plan and ordered it executed. Hooker was ordered from 
Bridgeport to Lookout Valley, and the command of the cooper- 
ating force from Chattanooga, which was to seize Brown's 
ferry and throw a bridge there to afford communication with 
the valley, was given to Gen. W. F. Smith and brilliantly 
executed. 

brown's ferry affair. 

On the night of October 26 parts of Hazen's and Turchin's 
brigades were marched across the neck of Moccasin Point and 
concealed near Brown's ferry. At 3 a. m. of the 27th fifty 
pontoon boats, each carrjdng thirty armed men, left the landing 
at Chattanooga and were floated quietly in the shadow of the 
willows lining the right bank of the river to Brown's ferry, 
where the leading boats landed on the left bank, the soldiers 
rushing into the gorge and ascending the ridge on each side of. 
it, and accomplishing the seizure of the po.sition, which was 
held by parts of two regiments of Law's brigade with a section 
of artillery. A pontoon bridge was immediately thrown, and 
the remainder of Hazen's and Turchin's brigades crossed to the 
new position. 

Hooker, with the two divisions of the Eleventh Corps — Schurz 
and Steinwehr — and Geary's of the Twelfth, marched from 
Bridgeport the morning of October 27, entered Lookout Valley 
the afternoon of the 28th, the Eleventh Corps proceeding to a 
junction with Smith at Brown's ferry, while Geary's division 
went into biouvac near Wauhatchie covering the road to Kelly's 
ferry. 

At midnight y^w-^mi^'i" division (of Lo7ig street^ attacked Geary, 
the battle continuing three hours. The Eleventh Corps, march- 



40 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

ing to the relief of Geary, attacked Je7iki?is's supports, and 
Long street' s force withdrew over Lookout, leaving L^ookout 
Valley and the short line of supplies in Union control. 

The Union Army was then rapidly refitted, and to attack 
Bragg Grant only awaited the arrival of Sherman, who had 
been ordered from Vicksburg with four divisions immediately 
after Chickamauga. 

November 21 Sherman had arrived, and by November 23 
three of his divisions were in camp behind the hills which were 
opposite the north end of Missionary Ridge. 

grant's pIvAn of b attire. 

The attack on Bragg' s position, which had been ordered for 
the 2ist, was delayed by waiting for Sherman, who was kept 
back by wretched roads. It opened on the 23d, though not 
according to plan. Under Grant's announced plan Hooker 
was to hold L,ookout Valley with Geary's division and Cruft's 
of the Fourth Corps. The Eleventh Corps was to be brought 
into Chattanooga on the 2 2d to cooperate either with Sherman 
or Thomas. Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at the mouth 
of the Chickamauga the night of the 23d, surprise and carry 
Missionary Ridge as far south as the Tunnel, this position not 
being then occupied by the enemy. Thomas, with the Army 
of the Cumberland, was to move to the left as soon as Sherman 
was astride the ridge, connect with Sherman's right, both then 
to sweep up the valley, crowding Bragg from his depot at 
Chickamauga Station, Tennessee, his communications, and his 
positions on the ridge. 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. ' 41 

CAPTURE OF ORCHARD KNOB. 

The battle departed widely from this plan. On Nov. 23 Grant, 
hearing that Bragg was withdrawing, directed Thomas to drive 
in his pickets and ascertain if he was still occupying his camps. 
Taking Wood's division and supporting it with Sheridan and 
Baird on the right, and Schurz and Steinwehr on the left, he 
charged forward from Fort Wood, captured Orchard Knob and 
the line on the low ridge south of it, which together constituted 
the enemy's advanced position in front of Missionary Ridge. 
This line was held. During the attack on Orchard Knob 
Walker' s division was dispatched from its position in the lines 
at the east foot of Lookout and sent to a position on Missionary 
Ridge about a mile south of the Tunnel. At night Sherman 
crossed the Tennessee unmolested. 

November 24, General Thomas having obtained permission 
from General Grant for Hooker to make a demonstration against 
lyookout Mountain, Hooker stormed it with Geary's and Cruft's 
divisions and Osterhaus's, which had been prevented from join- 
ing Sherman by the breaking of the Brown's ferry bridge. 

STORMING OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. 

Stevenson was in command on L,ookout Mountain. Six bri- 
gades were available for its defense. Only two, with three regi- 
ments of a third, were actively engaged, the brunt of the fighting 
being really borne by one, WalthalV s, which was posted on the 
western slope of the mountain below the palisades, while Moore' s 
brigade was on the eastern slope. 

Hooker moved from Wauhatchie early in the morning of 
November 24, crossed lyookout Creek at Light's mill, with 



42 The Campaign for- Chattanooga. 

Geary's division, supported by Whitaker's brigade of Cruft's 
division, and, concealed by the fog, marched by the flank up 
the mountain until his line reached the palisades. Then, fac- 
ing toward the point of the mountain after a march of nearly 
two miles, he struck the flank of WalthalVs brigade. As his 
lines approached the point, first the other brigades of Cruft's 
division joined Hooker's left, and then Osterhaus's two brigades, 
and together they swept around the mountain, forcing Wal- 
thall back of the Cravens House, where he was joined by Moore' s 
brigade and three regiments of Pettus's brigade from the summit. 
This position was held until about 3 a. m. of the 25th, when, the 
troops on the top of the mountain having been withdrawn, 
the force below the palisades confronting Hooker also descended 
into the plain and crossed to Missionary Ridge. No Union 
troops gained the summit of lyookout during the battle. Dur- 
ing the night the whole Confederate force in the valley was 
withdrawn to its crest, except as skirmishers were left in the 
rifle pits at the base of the ridge. Except as Walker's division 
had been ordered toward the north end of Missionary Ridge on 
the 23d, this was the first infantry occupation of the crest of the 
ridge. 

SHERMAN'S CROSSING AND ADVANCK. 

Before daylight of the 24th Sherman had 8,000 men in line 
on the south bank of the river facing the north of Missionary 
Ridge. At that time and until 2.30 in the afternoon the near- 
est Confederate troops were about a mile south of the Tunnel. 
At I o'clock Sherman moved forward and without encountering 
any enemy established his lines, about 4 p. m. , on the spurs 
north of Tunnel Hill. General Howard joined him early in the 
day with Buschbeck's brigade. 



The Campaign fo?'- Chattanooga. 43 

THE STORMING OF MISSIONARY RIDGE. 

At 7 o'clock on the 25th of November Sherman, with three 
of his own divisions, supported by Davis, from the Army of the 
Cumberland, and the two of the Eleventh Corps, began his 
attack on Tunnel Hill. This was defended by Cleburne's and 
Stevenson' s divisions. Sherman's attack continued until near 
4 p. m., but was unsuccessful. 

At 3.15 p. m. four divisions of the Army of the Cumberland 
moved from the Orchard Knob line to assault Missionary Ridge. 
Baird was on the left, Wood next, then Sheridan, and Johnson 
on the right. The signal for starting was six guns from Orchard 
Knob. The line had a front oi 2}4. miles. Each division was 
in double line, and some of the brigades in four. The left and 
right divisions started with the understanding that they were to 
assault the ridge. There was some confusion of orders at the 
center, which caused part of the line to halt after carrying the 
rifle pits at the base of the ridge. This, however, caused brief 
delay, and all the divisions seemed to reach the crest simulta- 
neously. C/ieat/iam' s division formed across the ridge north of 
Baird's left, and prevented the Union troops which had reached 
the summit from gaining ground to the left. This enabled all 
troops confronting Sherman, together with the divisions of 
Clieatham and Walker, to retire unmolested. 

Hooker left lyOokout Mountain at 10 a. m. for Rossville Gap, 
but owing to the destruction of the bridge over lyookout Creek 
he did not reach Rossville until 3 p. m. Osterhaus then pushed 
through the gap, dispersing part of Clayton'' s brigade, and, turn- 
ing north along the eastern base of Missionary Ridge, captured 
many prisoners from StewarVs division, which, at the same 



44 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

time, was under attack from Cruft, who assaulted and carried 
the point of the ridge north of the gap, and Geary, who 
assaulted from the west, and reached the crest soon after and 
south of the right flank of General Thomas's lines. The Army 
of the Cumberland in this assault captured 37 field guns and 
2,000 prisoners. Bragg retreated through Chickamauga Sta- 
tion, Tennessee, and Ringgold to Dalton, Hooker in pursuit, 
having a severe engagement at Ringgold Gap. 

It is difficult to make a close estimate of the opposing forces 
at Chickamauga. The best estimate with all information now 
available seems to be that which places the Union forces in 
action at 55,000 and Bragg' s at 70,000 as a minimum. 

General Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee with an effective 
force of all arms equipped for duty of a few hundred more than 
60,000. Of this number Wagner's brigade, with 2,061 effect- 
ives, was at Chattanooga, leaving the Union force in front of 
Bragg slightly less than 58,000. It was several thousand less 
at the battle, Post's brigade of Davis's division and three regi- 
ments of infantry and one battery, in all, six regiments and two 
batteries, being engaged in guarding supply trains. 

In a letter from General Lee to President Davis, dated Sep- 
tember 14, 1863, the following figures of Bragg' s actual and 
prospective strength are thus stated : 

If the report sent to me by General Cooper since my return from Rich- 
mond is correct, General Bragg had, on the 20th of August last, 51,101 
effective men; Q,^xvq.x^ Biickner, 16,118. He was to receive from General 
Johnson 9,000. His total force will, therefore, be 76,219, as large a num- 
ber as I presume he can operate with. This is independent of the local 
troops, which, you may recollect, he reported as exceeding his expecta- 
tions. 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 45 

It will be well to remember, in comiection with these official 
figures, that Bragg, after the battle, reported Lo7igstreef s 
force, which was not included by Lee, 5,000. This, according 
to the figures furnished General Lee, gave Bragg 81,219. 
According to General Johnsoji' s correspandence, after he had 
sent 9,000 to Bragg, he subsequently dispatched him two small 
brigades, and these reached him the day before the battle. 

At the time the battle was fully joined on the second day the 
entire Union infantry force was on the firing line, and there were 
no reserves. At the same time the Union left was overlapped 
by two brigades of infantry, Breckinridge' s, and two divisions of 
cavalry, Forrest's, one of these operating as infantr3^ The 
Union right was overlapped by an entire infantry division, Pres- 
ton's. Waiker's corps of two divisions {LiddelPs and Gist's) 
were the reserve of Bragg' s right wing, and CheatJiam' s division 
of five brigades the reserve of his right center. In addition, at 
the center Law and Kersliazv in column of divisions formed a 
reserve for BusJirod JoJinson, who was on the first line. 

As both Union and Confederate lines were continuous, and as 
the locations of all divisions on the ground are now known, it is 
clear that whatever the actual figures for either side may have 
been, Bragg' s forces largely outnumbered those of Rosecrans. 

The casualties of each army were 33 per cent of those 
engaged. 

The long-accepted version of Sunday's break on Rosecrans's 
right was that the two corps of Crittenden and McCook were 
swept off the field; but only five brigades of McCook 's entire 
corps left the field, and the fragments which went from Crit- 
tenden would not exceed two brigades. Palmer's and John- 
son's divisions, which fought splendidly to the end under 



46 The Campaign for Chattanooga. 

Thomas on the left, were respectively from Crittenden's and 
McCook's corps. Harker's brigade of Wood's division belonged 
to Crittenden. Barnes's brigade, which fought on the extreme 
left, and part of Dick's and Samuel Beatty's were all of Van 
Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps. In other words, the 
larger part of Crittenden's force fought to the last. Of the 
Fourteenth Corps (Thomas), four regiments of Wilder's brigade 
of Reynolds's division were detached and cut off with the right, 
and a considerable part of Negley's division went to the 
rear, chiefly through the mismanagement of its commander. 
Stanley's brigade, and part of Sirwell's, of Negley, were with 
Thomas to the last. The battle of Sunday was not the fight 
of any one corps, but of the Army of the Cumberland. There 
was no disorderly retreat of the army on Chattanooga, and 
nothing approaching it. 

The greater portion of the right wing, which was cut off and 
certainly thrown into much confusion, was reorganized at Ross- 
viile, and occupied its place in line at that point throughout the 
next day and until the army moved on in the night to occupy 
Chattanooga. The battle was desperate from the moment it 
opened till its close. For the most part the lines fought at 
close range, and, in the countless assaults, often hand to hand. 
On the first day there were no fieldworks of any kind. On the 
second Thomas was protected by such rude log works as could 
be hastily thrown together. Brannan and Steedman were with- 
out a semblance of works. The battle in the main, on both 
sides, was dogged, stand-up fighting far within the limit of 
point-blank range. For the second day, on the Confederate 
side, the contest was one continued series of brave assaults. 

A single comparison will bring out the magnitude of the 



The Campaign for Chattanooga. 47 

operations of Rosecrans and Bragg, and also the deadliness of 
the fighting. 

The Army of the Cumberland, at Chickamauga, had only two 
less infantry regiments than the Army of the Potomac in the 
Seven Days' battles, and Bragg had only three less than the 
Army of Norther7i Virginia in those battles, a total difference for 
the combined armies of only five regiments of infantry. The 
reported losses of Rosecrans at Chickamauga in two days were 
16, 179, and of McClellan in the Seven Days' battles only 15,849, 
or 330 less than Rosecrans; of Bragg, in two days, 17,804; of 
Lee, in Seven Days' battles, 19,749. Rosecrans's missing, not- 
withstanding the long-current exaggerations of the disaster to 
his right, were only 4,774, against 6,053 i^^ ^^^^ Seven Days' 
battles. The total losses of both sides in the Seven Days' bat- 
tles were only 1,615 niore than Rosecrans's and Bragg' s for the 
two days at Chickamauga. In this comparison, however, it 
should be remembered that the regiments of 1862 were numeri- 
cally stronger than those of 1863. 

FORCES AT CHATTANOOGA. 

Bragg, after the departure of Longstreet and two brigades of 
Buckner' s division, had about 40,000 men for his firing line. 
Grant had about 60,000. Bragg' s dominating positions on 
Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge much more than com- 
pensated by militarj^ rules for his disparit)' in numbers. 

Of the Union force. Hooker had a few less than 10,000 in the 
battle of Lookout Mountain. Thomas's assaulting line at the 
center numbered about 22,000.' Sherman had about 28,000 
about the north end of Missionary Ridge. 



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